Japan Foreign Policy
Introduction
Foreign policy making in Japan is a contentious process that involves various institutional and ideational factors. The weak position of the prime minister vis-à-vis fragmented sub-governments, the nexus between politicians, bureaucrats, and businesspeople, and the existence of powerful veto players are some of the institutional constraints that put into question the prime minister’s and foreign minister’s abilities to exert leadership in a top-down manner.
On the other hand, the antimilitary social norms and culture, stemming from the traumatic history of the country, are considered by constructivists as dominant domestic factors behind Tokyo’s pacifist security policy. The study of foreign policy making in Japan also highlights the impact of central government reforms on the balance of power in foreign policy making.
The Actor’s Behind Japan’s Foreign Policy
The study of foreign policy making in Japan suggests that the power struggles between three key actors, namely the Kantei (prime minister and his or her closest entourage), MOFA officials, and ruling party backbenchers, are significant factors behind foreign policy making in Japan.
The Kantei appeared to be a coherent actor, but in reality, most of its administrative staff recruited from and represented the interests of separate ministries.
MOFA was an even less homogenous institution, with distinct regional bureaus and divisions pursuing their sectional goals.
The ruling party constituted the least coherent of the three actors, with parliamentary tribes promoting contradictory interests. The power of MOFA bureaucrats and their unwillingness to change the status quo have been cited as one of the reasons for the exceptional stability of Japan’s foreign policy in the postwar period.
The study also highlights the impact of central government reforms on the balance of power in foreign policy making, which strengthened the position of the prime minister and his or her closest entourage, but the politicians in the government were far from given a free hand in conducting diplomacy in a top-down manner.
External Factors That Influence Japan’s Foreign Policy Making
External factors, such as the bipolar nature of the international system during the Cold War, Sino-American rapprochement in the 1970s, power shifts after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the evolving dynamics of the post-Cold War era, have significantly influenced Japan’s foreign and security policies.
However, these systemic pressures translated into concrete decisions in Japan’s foreign policy only after being filtered through the biased perceptions of statespersons, ideological and factional cleavages in the ruling parties, bureaucracy-led administrative structures, or constraints stemming from the “pacifist” Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution.
The study emphasizes that while external incentives set the general contour of Japan’s behavior on the international scene, they were significantly influenced by contextual domestic-level factors, such as the complexity of decision-making mechanisms, the weak position of the prime minister vis-à-vis fragmented subgovernments, and the nexus between politicians, bureaucrats, and businesspeople.
Economic Factors
Global economic trends can significantly affect Japan’s foreign policy making. For example, Japan’s economic interests in the Asia-Pacific region have led to its active participation in regional economic integration initiatives, such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). Japan’s foreign policy has also been influenced by its economic relations with China and the United States, two of its largest trading partners.
Central Government Reforms And Foreign Policy Making In Japan
Central government reforms in Japan have significantly impacted foreign policy making in the country. The administrative reform, conceived and drafted by Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryutaro in 1996–1998 and implemented under the Mori Yoshiro administration in January 2001, aimed to strengthen the position of the prime minister vis-à-vis bureaucrats and enhance his or her control over separate ministries.
The central government reforms provided more power to the Kantei (prime minister’s office) in order to overcome sectional frictions and enhance the prime minister’s control over separate ministries.
War on Terrorism
During the Koizumi cabinet, Japan’s response to the events of 9/11 was not the result of U.S. pressure, but rather the political leanings and convictions of the prime minister. Koizumi set up a liaison office at the Emergency Operation Center to gather information and later declared a War on Terrorism.
He emphasized that Japan’s Self-Defense Forces (SDF) would not cooperate in America’s military operations but would participate in cooperation efforts as a member of the international community. Koizumi presented the government’s policy to strongly support the United States, framing the issue in terms of national interest and claiming to respect Article 9.
He wanted Japan to assume an “honorable position” in the international community by preparing a cooperation and support system for the United States and other states engaged in the War on Terrorism. The policies adopted under the Koizumi cabinet, including the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law, the Emergency Law, and the Law Concerning the Special Measures for Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq, were related to the Japan–U.S. security alliance, and Koizumi’s strong leadership and effective policy priorities were evident during his term in office.
Historical Problem
During the Koizumi administration, history problems caused a significant deterioration in Japan’s relations with China and South Korea. The prime minister’s obstinate yearly visits to the Yasukuni Shrine and the failure to address concerns over Japanese history textbooks led to anti-Japanese sentiments in these countries.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) bureaucrats, concerned about the impact of history problems on diplomacy, tried to convince the prime minister to stop visiting Yasukuni. Even some of Koizumi’s closest associates, such as Chief Cabinet Secretary Fukuda Yasuo, advocated for a more accommodative stance towards neighboring countries. The contentious nature of Japanese diplomacy was revealed both in the Kantei–MOFA–ruling party triangle and within the ruling party itself.
Koizumi’s unyielding posture on history problems was partly attributed to his nationalistic endeavors and his desire to approach right-wing politicians. This stance, however, led to antagonism with the influential group of moderate lawmakers in the ruling party. The history problems under the Koizumi administration highlighted the internal contention within the Japanese government and the challenges of addressing delicate historical issues in the context of foreign policy.
Yasukuni Shrine
The Yasukuni Shrine is a Shinto shrine located in Yasukuni, Japan, and is dedicated to the enshrined spirits of the Japanese military personnel who died during the war. The shrine has been a subject of controversy and debate, particularly due to its association with Japan’s past military activities and the potential implications for regional relations. During the Koizumi cabinet, the prime minister’s visit to the Yasukuni Shrine in August 2006 sparked protests from neighboring countries, such as China and South Korea, who viewed the visit as a violation of their countries’ sovereignty rights and an affront to their efforts to promote reconciliation and cooperation in the region
Japan’s initial reaction to pressure from China and South Korea was marked by a complex process of decision-making and internal debates. When Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi visited the Yasukuni Shrine in August 2006, he faced opposition from both Chinese and South Korean governments, which viewed the visit as a violation of their countries’ sovereignty rights and an affront to their efforts to promote reconciliation and cooperation in the region.
The Japanese government’s response to the pressure from China and South Korea was influenced by various factors, including domestic politics, bureaucratic interests, and the prime minister’s personal convictions. For instance, Prime Minister Koizumi’s visit to Yasukuni Shrine was partly driven by his nationalistic endeavors and his desire to approach right-wing politicians.
The Japanese government’s initial reaction to the pressure from China and South Korea also highlighted the internal contention within the Japanese government and the challenges of addressing delicate historical issues in the context of foreign policy. For example, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) bureaucrats, concerned about the impact of history issues on diplomacy, tried to convince the prime minister to stop visiting Yasukuni. However, Koizumi’s personal convictions and his desire to approach right-wing politicians led him to continue with his plans.
In summary, Japan’s initial reaction to pressure from China and South Korea was a complex process influenced by various factors, including domestic politics, bureaucratic interests, and the prime minister’s personal convictions. The response highlighted the internal contention within the Japanese government and the challenges of addressing delicate historical issues in the context of foreign policy.
Suspension Of Contacts With China At The End Of Koizumi Administration
At the end of the Koizumi administration, there was a suspension of contacts with China due to several factors. One of the key factors was the suspension of the China-Japan high-level meetings in 2006, which were initially scheduled to be held in July but were postponed due to the Japanese government’s lack of progress in addressing Chinese concerns over the Yasukuni Shrine visits and other history-related issues.
The suspension of high-level meetings between Japan and China was a significant event, as it indicated a deterioration in bilateral relations. The Chinese government expressed disappointment and frustration over Japan’s failure to address their concerns, leading to the postponement of the meetings. This decision was a clear sign of the impact of history issues on Japan’s foreign policy and the challenges of managing relations with neighboring countries.
The suspension of contacts with China also highlighted the internal contention within the Japanese government and the difficulties in addressing delicate historical issues in the context of foreign policy. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) bureaucrats, concerned about the impact of history issues on diplomacy, tried to convince the prime minister to stop visiting Yasukuni. However, Koizumi’s personal convictions and his desire to approach right-wing politicians led him to continue with his plan.
Rapprochement With China
Under the Abe and Fukuda Cabinets, there were efforts to improve relations with China, which had been strained due to historical issues and territorial disputes. In 2006, Prime Minister Abe Shinzo visited China and held talks with Chinese leaders, signaling a thaw in bilateral relations. The two countries agreed to establish a “mutually beneficial relationship based on common strategic interests” and to work together on regional and global issues. The Fukuda Cabinet continued this trend, with Prime Minister Fukuda Yasuo visiting China in 2007 and signing a joint statement with Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao, which emphasized the importance of dialogue and cooperation between the two countries. The statement also addressed the issue of historical disputes, stating that the two countries would “face history squarely and advance towards the future” and work towards building a “strategic, mutually beneficial relationship based on common interests”.
The rapprochement with China under the Abe and Fukuda Cabinets was a significant development in Japan’s foreign policy, as it signaled a shift towards a more cooperative and constructive relationship with China. The efforts to improve relations were driven by a recognition of the importance of China as a regional and global power, as well as a desire to address historical issues and territorial disputes in a peaceful and constructive manner.
East Asian Community
The East Asian Community (EAC) initiative was first proposed by then-Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi in 2003 as a means to foster closer economic and political ties among Japan, China, and South Korea. The idea behind the EAC was to create a regional community that would promote cooperation in various areas, such as trade, investment, and security, and ultimately lead to a more stable and prosperous region. The initiative was seen as a response to the growing economic influence of China and South Korea, which were rapidly emerging as major regional powers.
The EAC initiative was driven by the recognition of the importance of these countries as significant regional and global players, as well as a desire to address historical issues and territorial disputes in a peaceful and constructive manner. However, the initiative faced several challenges, including opposition from some members of the Japanese government, concerns about the potential impact on existing alliances and security arrangements, and the lack of a clear roadmap for implementing the EAC.
Kan Naoto and the end of EAC
According to the provided document, the EAC initiative faced challenges during the Kan Naoto administration, which ultimately led to its end. The EAC initiative was initially proposed by Prime Minister Koizumi in 2003 as a means to foster closer economic and political ties among Japan, China, and South Korea. However, the initiative faced several challenges, including opposition from some members of the Japanese government, concerns about the potential impact on existing alliances and security arrangements, and the lack of a clear roadmap for implementing the EAC.
During the Kan Naoto administration, the EAC initiative faced further challenges, including the global financial crisis and the Fukushima nuclear disaster, which diverted attention and resources away from the initiative. Additionally, there were concerns about the potential impact of the EAC on Japan’s existing alliances and security arrangements, particularly with the United States. As a result, the Kan administration shifted its focus towards strengthening Japan’s existing alliances and partnerships, rather than pursuing the EAC initiative.
In summary, the EAC initiative faced challenges during the Kan Naoto administration, which ultimately led to its end. The initiative faced opposition from some members of the Japanese government, concerns about the potential impact on existing alliances and security arrangements, and the lack of a clear roadmap for implementation. Additionally, the global financial crisis and the Fukushima nuclear disaster diverted attention and resources away from the initiative, and there were concerns about its potential impact on Japan’s existing alliances and partnerships.