Failed State And State-building Interventions

State failure refers to a condition where a state is unable to perform its basic duties and responsibilities. The key characteristics of state failure include the inability of the state to maintain a monopoly on the use of force, provide public services, and sustain a functioning economy and market.

While state failure was initially viewed mainly as a humanitarian and economic concern, the events of 9/11 brought increased focus on failed states as sources of transnational security threats. Weak and fragile states can provide safe havens for terrorist groups to operate. The 2002 US National Security Strategy argued that America was now “threatened less by conquering states than we are by failing ones.” State failure came to be seen not just as an internal or regional issue, but one with consequences for international security. The response has been an emphasis on interventions aimed at stabilizing and strengthening weak states, known as state-building interventions.

Characteristics of State Failure

A state can be considered as having failed when it is no longer able to perform some of its core functions. The characteristics of a failed state often include:

• Loss of monopoly on force - The state no longer maintains control over its territory and borders. Instead, militias, warlords or insurgent groups may control parts of the state’s territory. The state loses its monopoly on the legitimate use of force.
• Inability to provide public services - The state can no longer provide basic public services to its citizens including education, healthcare, social services, and utilities. State institutions become ineffective in delivering services.
• Economic collapse - The state’s economy collapses leading to increased poverty, unemployment, inflation, and lack of economic development. Formal economic activity decreases while illicit trade and underground markets thrive.
• Widespread corruption and criminality - Corruption becomes rampant across state institutions. Criminality increases with little law enforcement capacity to respond. Confidence in state institutions deteriorates.
• Involuntary movement of populations - Conflict and insecurity lead to massive internal displacement and refugee outflows as citizens flee violence.

A failing or failed state is unable to control its territory, sustain a functioning economy, or meet citizens’ basic needs. State collapse poses risks within and beyond the country’s borders.

State Failure and State-Building Interventions

State-building interventions (SBIs) refer to a broad range of programs and projects designed to build or strengthen the capacity of institutions within a state to perform the functions of modern governance. The goals of SBIs include:

• Building effective and legitimate state institutions to maintain law and order, collect taxes, deliver public services, and other governance functions.
• Promoting economic development through market reforms, infrastructure investment, and integration into the global economy.
• Establishing the rule of law, an impartial legal system, and protections for human rights.
• Fostering inclusive political participation and processes.

SBIs can be pre-emptive projects focused on strengthening institutions and governance capacity before state failure occurs. These risk management interventions aim to mitigate conditions that could lead to conflict or crisis in the future.

SBIs can also be reactive efforts carried out after state failure, conflict, or regime change. These post-conflict peacebuilding and reconstruction interventions seek to repair damaged institutions and lay new foundations for stability and development. Both pre-emptive and reactive SBIs fundamentally aim to build state capacity, though their timing and context differ.

The Liberal View of SBIs

The liberal view suggests that conflicting groups are merely a symptom of state failure, not the core cause. Proponents argue that the central problem of failed states is the absence of functioning political institutions. They point to interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan as failures due to the lack of long-term planning and preparation. Specifically, there were no ready political elements to govern, and no mechanisms in place to provide basic services to the civilian population.

The liberal perspective holds that the only way to mitigate state weakness and alleviate conflict is through market-led development, which can only occur if the proper institutions exist. Therefore, the central focus should be on rebuilding state institutions and capacity. The goal is to get the machinery of the state back into functional order. By creating the right institutional conditions and framework, economic development and stability will follow.

Criticisms of the Liberal View

The liberal view of state failure and state-building interventions has been criticized on several grounds:

• It does not consider that states are not just functional instruments but also the objects of political contestation. The liberal perspective sees states merely as service providers, ignoring the political dynamics and power struggles involved in state formation and governance. States embody certain power relations and promote the interests of particular groups over others. State-building involves reshaping these power relations, not just capacity building.
• Their notions of “failed states” are based on how a state ought to function rather than actual political dynamics. The indicators used, like lack of public services or widespread corruption, tell us what is not happening but not the underlying reasons. The liberal view does not analyze the existing political and social dynamics in a “failed” state.
• State capacity is seen in narrow terms as capacity to function, not the capacity to privilege certain interests. State capacity involves the ability of institutions to distribute power and resources in society. Interventions to build state capacity inevitably affect which interests gain or lose power.
• State-building interventions essentially reshape the distribution and reproduction of power within societies. By altering state institutions and governance, SBIs reshape political dynamics and marginalize some interests over others. This amounts to a form of external domination, not just functional capacity building.

Case Study: Afghanistan

Afghanistan provides an illuminating example of the complexities of state-building interventions. Rivalries between local leaders led to many being wrongly detained in Guantanamo Bay. Dr. Hafizullah, Zurmat’s first governor, was sent to Guantanamo because he had crossed Police Chief Mujahed. Mujahed himself ended up there for crossing the Americans. Security chief Naim was also detained for an old rivalry with Mullah Qassim. Qassim avoided capture, but someone else with the same name was mistakenly sent to Guantanamo instead. Abdullah Khan found himself in Guantanamo charged with being Khairullah Khairkhwa, the former Taliban minister of the interior, despite the fact that Khairkhwa was also detained there at the same time. Most strikingly, nine Guantanamo inmates claimed proof of their innocence - they had gone directly from a Taliban jail to American custody after 2001.

The numerous mistaken detentions show how complex local power dynamics had unintended consequences for the state-building intervention. Rivalries between local leaders led to false accusations that undermined the justice process. The dynamics between the Americans, Taliban, and local leaders were not sufficiently understood. This example highlights the challenges of strengthening institutions amid complex local political contests for power.

Case Study: Libya

Libya presents an interesting case study of a failed state following foreign intervention. In 2011, the UN Security Council authorized a NATO military intervention in Libya with the stated goal of protecting civilians during the Libyan Civil War. Rebel forces, with the aid of NATO airstrikes, were able to overthrow the authoritarian regime of Muammar Gaddafi.

Initially, there was optimism that Libya would transition to a peaceful democracy following Gaddafi’s ouster. Former UK Prime Minister David Cameron hailed Libya’s transitional government and stated “What an honour it is to be here in Tripoli…to see how the Libyan people are taking their country back and taking it forward to a new era.”

However, Libya quickly descended into a “bloody lawless nightmare” following Gaddafi’s fall. The weak transitional government struggled to assert control and fill the power vacuum. Heavily armed militias and factions emerged that were divided along regional, tribal, and ideological lines. These militias refused to disarm and often used violence to exert control over territories and populations.

Central governance in Libya collapsed as militias took over state functions in areas under their control. The transitional government was forced to placate militia demands in order to avoid further violence. This dynamic allowed militias to gain even more power and influence. As a result, Libya lacks any semblance of the rule of law and suffers from widespread instability and violence.

The Libyan experience illustrates the immense challenges of rebuilding state institutions and establishing stability following foreign-backed regime change. It remains a cautionary tale of how even well-intentioned interventions can go awry and unleash devastating consequences for the local population.

Case Study: Syria

Syria provides an example of the immense challenges faced in establishing governance and rule of law in a conflict-ridden state. After years of civil war, the governance structure in Syria has essentially collapsed. Various armed factions control different areas of the country, undermining the authority of the central government. Rebuilding effective governance will require negotiating power-sharing arrangements between these factions, which have competing interests and visions for Syria’s future.

Additionally, there is debate over whether Western countries have the commitment required for long-term state-building efforts. The experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrated that establishing security, governance, and rule of law requires an extended presence and investment over many years, if not decades. However, fatigue over those long wars has made Western countries wary of another open-ended commitment. Syrian reconstruction will depend on a political settlement between warring parties, after which state-building can begin in earnest. But it remains to be seen whether outside powers will dedicate adequate resources and time for governance to take root. The risk is that inability to establish order leads to future cycles of conflict and state failure in Syria.