Civil-Military Relations in Indonesia

Introduction

Indonesia’s military has played a central role in the country’s politics and governance throughout its history, from independence in 1945 to the present day. During the authoritarian “New Order” era under President Suharto from 1965 to 1998, the military was a key pillar supporting his regime, with both political and economic power. However, since the collapse of the New Order and Indonesia’s transition to democracy, the role and position of the military has evolved significantly. Democratization has required the military to withdraw from day-to-day politics and governance and focus on national defense and security matters. At the same time, the military has retained significant influence, presenting ongoing challenges in civil-military relations in the country. Key issues include the military’s distrust of political Islam, its vast economic interests developed under the New Order, and debates over its proper role in a democratic Indonesia. This content examines the major historical shifts and current tensions in civil-military relations in the post-Suharto democratic era. Understanding this complex dynamic between military, political and civilian actors is crucial to analyzing Indonesia’s democratization progress and future policy directions.

Dwifungsi Doctrine Under Sukarno and Suharto

The dwifungsi (“dual function”) doctrine refers to the Indonesian military’s formalized role in politics and security matters. The origins of dwifungsi trace back to General Abdul Haris Nasution during the era of President Sukarno in the 1950s and 1960s.

Nasution introduced the military’s perspective of being the guardian of national unity and order, which later became known as the “middle path.” The doctrine justified military involvement in government by positioning the armed forces as protectors of the Indonesian revolution.

Later, under President Suharto’s New Order regime beginning in the 1960s, dwifungsi became further entrenched. The military secured appointed positions across all levels of legislature. This institutionalized the military’s function as both a security force and sociopolitical actor. The New Order provided the doctrinal basis for the military’s central role in governance and politics leading up to 1998.

Military’s Central Role Pre-1998

The Indonesian military held a central role in Indonesia prior to 1998, with a strong focus on its position as the guardian of national unity. This perspective was rooted in the military’s foundational role in the Indonesian revolution and independence struggle against Dutch colonial rule.

After independence in 1945, the military saw itself as the protector of the new nation. This was formalized through the doctrine of dwifungsi, which emphasized the military’s dual role as both a defense force and a socio-political force. The military sought to defend the unitary state of Indonesia against separatist movements and ideological threats from communism or political Islam.

Under President Sukarno in the 1950s and 1960s, the military grew in prominence as Sukarno relied heavily on the loyalty of the armed forces. The military leadership at the time, led by General Nasution, believed that the army must play an active role in politics and governance to defend national interests.

This political role was further entrenched under President Suharto’s New Order regime from 1965-1998. The military was seen as the backbone of the regime and the guardian of stability, unity, and order. Suharto relied on the military to suppress dissent, while military officers were appointed to key political and economic positions. The military’s socio-political function was seen as essential to managing Indonesia’s diversity and fragility.

Post-1998 Reforms and New Leaders

The fall of Suharto in 1998 marked a major shift in Indonesia’s civil-military relations. As the country transitioned towards democracy, the military began ceding some of its political power. However, the military remained a dominant force during this fragile period.

Under President BJ Habibie, who took over after Suharto resigned, the military maintained substantial influence. Habibie had served as Suharto’s vice president and was viewed as an extension of the old regime. The military ensured their interests were protected during Habibie’s short term.

Greater change came under President Abdurrahman Wahid, who was elected by the People’s Consultative Assembly in 1999. Wahid aimed to establish civilian supremacy over the military, which caused tensions. He made efforts to remove the military’s formal representation in the legislature and pushed officers implicated in human rights abuses during the Suharto era to retire.

Wahid also wanted to establish diplomatic relations with Israel, which the TNI opposed. Despite resistance, Wahid’s presidency marked the beginning of reforms limiting the military’s formal political power. But the TNI remained influential, especially due to its vast economic interests.

Persisting Challenges

Even as Indonesia’s military took on a less dominant role after 1998, challenges persist in civil-military relations. One major issue stems from the military’s distrust of political Islam. The Indonesian armed forces have been dominated by secular nationalists in the leadership ranks since independence. This created skepticism within the military establishment towards Muslim political movements, which were seen as a potential threat to national unity and stability.

The military’s historical role in suppressing Muslim rebellions in the 1950s and 1960s exacerbated this distrust towards political Islam. Campaigns against Darul Islam and other uprisings left the armed forces wary of Muslim political mobilization. As a result, the secular nationalism prevalent in the military creates tensions with Islamist parties and hinders fully harmonious civil-military relations. Even though the military no longer asserts direct political control, its unease with political Islam lingers and poses an obstacle to smooth relations between military leadership and emerging democratic institutions.

Military’s Economic Interests

The New Order era under President Suharto saw the development of military-run businesses across various sectors of the economy. This allowed the military to amass significant economic interests and financial resources outside of its defense activities.

Some of the key businesses that the military became involved in included:

• Natural resource extraction - The military moved into controlling various mining and plantations interests across the archipelago. This provided lucrative revenue streams from the country’s vast natural resources in timber, palm oil, coal, nickel and other minerals.

• Finance - Military-linked banks and financial institutions were established, providing financing services to military businesses and personnel. Key banks have included Bank Artha Graha and Bank Bumi Daya.

• Real estate - The military expanded into commercial and residential real estate development in urban centers across Java, Bali and other parts of Indonesia. Luxury housing projects and shopping centers became part of the military’s business portfolio.

• Construction - Military engineering and construction groups undertook large-scale infrastructure projects, including toll roads, ports and airports. These capital-intensive projects relied on the military’s project mobilization capabilities.

This vast economic involvement provided significant off-budget revenue for the military’s interests. It also strengthened the military’s influence across political and business circles in Indonesia during this era. However, it posed challenges for establishing proper oversight and balance in civil-military relations after 1998.

Megawati Administration

The administration of President Megawati Sukarnoputri from 2001 to 2004 marked a period of more harmonious civil-military relations in Indonesia. As the daughter of Indonesia’s founding father Sukarno, Megawati brought an air of stability and national unity during a time of democratic transition.

Upon becoming president, Megawati exercised civilian control over the military by selecting loyalists for key military leadership positions. This included General Sutarto as the commander of the armed forces. At the same time, Megawati did not aggressively pursue investigations into past military human rights abuses, which helped avoid confrontations.

Megawati also reduced the formal political role of the military. She dissolved the military faction in parliament and separated the police force from the military. These reforms shifted the military’s focus towards external defense while ending its domestic security role.

Additionally, Megawati empowered reformist officers and marginalized hardliners. This helped professionalize the armed forces and align them with democratic principles. The military supported Megawati’s presidency, seeing her as a source of stability amidst Indonesia’s fragile democracy.

In turn, Megawati recognized the military’s important role in national unity and nation-building. She treated the military with respect while asserting civilian control. This balance created a more constructive partnership between civilian leaders and the armed forces.

Overall, Megawati’s pragmatic approach produced a period of cooperative civil-military relations. Her presidency marked a shift away from the military’s dominant political position during the New Order era. Though challenges remained, Megawati helped normalize democratic oversight of the military.

Quelling Muslim Rebellions

One source of the Indonesian military’s distrust of political Islam stems from its historical role in suppressing Muslim rebellions during the 1950s and 1960s. The most significant of these was the Darul Islam rebellion, which emerged in West Java in the 1940s under the leadership of S.M. Kartosuwirjo. Darul Islam sought to establish Indonesia as an Islamic state under sharia law.

The movement grew in strength during the 1950s as the central government was embroiled in regional rebellions across the archipelago. By 1962, Darul Islam had around 15,000 armed guerillas and controlled territories in West Java, South Sulawesi, Aceh, and South Kalimantan. The Indonesian military finally quashed the main Darul Islam rebellion in West Java in 1962 after a 12-year campaign. However, splinter Darul Islam movements continued in remote areas until the early 1970s.

Suppressing the Darul Islam rebellion required tremendous effort from the Indonesian army over more than a decade. Thousands of troops were involved in encircling and rooting out rebel enclaves. This campaign left an enduring mark on the military leadership, ingraining both disdain for radical political Islam as well as confidence in the army’s ability to defeat such movements. The suppression of Darul Islam cemented the military’s self-perception as defenders of Indonesia’s secular nationalist ideology against what they saw as extremist elements. This outlook continues to shape the military’s distrustful stance towards political Islam today.

Democratic Reforms

The post-Suharto era saw major reforms aimed at decentralizing power and increasing accountability within the military and political system. Some key democratic reforms included:

• Decentralization of governmental powers to provinces and districts through laws enacted in 1999 and 2004. This shifted significant authority away from Jakarta towards local governments.

• Changes in civil-military relations, including the separation of the police force from the military in 1999. The police formally came under the jurisdiction of the president rather than the military.

• The establishment of the TNI Territorial Command Structure, dividing the army’s territorial organization along provincial and district borders to align with the decentralized system. This aimed to increase accountability.

• The gradual removal of appointed military representatives from political bodies at national, provincial and district levels during reforms from 1999-2004.

• Requiring all active TNI personnel to retire from military service before running for or taking up civilian political posts. This addressed previous issues of “dual function” roles.

• Establishing human rights courts and ad hoc human rights tribunals to investigate allegations of human rights violations by the military.

• Generally increasing civilian oversight, auditing and scrutiny of the military’s finances and businesses. This helped reduce corruption and illegal practices.

The democratic reforms ultimately sought to embed accountability mechanisms, increase transparency, decentralize power from Jakarta, and reduce the military’s direct role in governmental affairs. The process of reform has been gradual but impactful.

Conclusion

Indonesia’s civil-military relations have undergone significant changes from the central role of the military under past authoritarian leaders to a more balanced relationship in the post-Suharto democratic era.

The military doctrine of dwifungsi established the military as a sociopolitical force beyond just national defense, allowing the armed forces to have an outsized influence on politics and the economy under Sukarno and Suharto’s long tenures. Following Suharto’s fall in 1998, Indonesia embarked on a fragile transition to democracy, accompanied by reforms that reduced the military’s formal role in politics and governance.

However, challenges remain due to the military’s vast economic interests, suspicion of political Islam, and lingering authoritarian tendencies. The military continues to wield influence informally through its network of businesses and retired officers in civilian roles. Issues like accountability for past human rights abuses also remain unresolved.

The post-authoritarian period has seen gradual improvements in civil-military balance under leaders like Megawati, though more progress is needed to consolidate democratic norms. As Indonesia evolves politically, managing the military’s role in an increasingly pluralistic landscape will be an ongoing task requiring deft leadership and negotiation. Ultimately, a constructive civil-military dynamic that respects democratic values will be key to Indonesia’s future as a mature democracy.